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The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it Ruled that 
the Causes of Action in Porter's Amended Complaint Against 
National Surety Were Barred by the Statute of Limitations 
— — nf v1 • — — 
Porter articulated eight issues on appeal with respect to the Dismissal of Porter's 
claims against National Surety Corporation (sometimes "National," or "National 
Surety"). Porter will summarize its arguments with respect to each of these issues, and/or 
respond to National's opposition, as follows: 
Rule 15 Related Issues - the following are the issues on appeal identified by 
Porter which have as their basis a URCivP Rule 15 analysis: 
Was it reversible error for Judge Bohling to conclude that Porter's Amended 
Complaint raising claims against National did not relate back to the date of the filing of 
the original Complaint under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Were their issues of fact as to the closeness of the relationship between Fox and 
National, and whether and how much National knew about Porter's claims and lawsuit, 
which should have precluded granting summary judgment in favor of National? 
Was it error for Judge Bohling to conclude that simply because the relationship 
between Fox and National was one of privity of contract, there could not be a sufficient 
closeness of relationship or identity of interest to warrant relation back under Rule 15( c)? 
Was it reversible error for the Court, pursuant to the Motion for Relief from 
Summary Judgment, to fail to hold (a) that there is always a close-enough relationship 
between a contractor and its surety to allow relation back, (b) that based upon the 
admissions of Floyd Cox presented to the Court, there was a sufficiently close 
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relationship between Fox and its Surety to allow relation back, and/or (c) the issue of 
closeness of Fox and its Surety was at least disputed and should have been detemiined by 
the trier of fact before the Court concluded that there should be no relationship back? 
The Law Relating to Rule 15 
In these regards, U.R.Civ.P, Rule 15 ( c) provides as follows: 
"(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading." 
As indicated in Porter's Appellee's brief, generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an 
amendment which substitutes or adds new parties for those brought before the court by 
the original pleadings. But, the Utah Supreme Court has made an exception to the 
general rule. "The exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff 
and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed 
or proved the relation back is not prejudicial." Sulzen v. Williams,911 P.2d 497, 501 
(Utah App. 1999) quoting, Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). It 
has been further held, that parties have an identity of interest when "the real parties in 
interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them 
unofficially, from an early stage." Doxey-Layton Co., 548 P.2d at 906. Cf. Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995) (noting that identity of interest exists 
when existing parties and those sought to be added are so closely related "that notice of 
the action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the other") (citation 
omitted). 
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Under the Nunez v. Albo and Penrose v. Rose Decisions, the Relationship 
Between Fox and National Surety was Close Enough to Satisfy the "Identity of 
Interest" Requirement for Relating Back. Porter's main argument with respect to the 
Rule 15 related issues on appeal was that Judge Bohling was simply wrong when he ruled 
that just because the relationship between Fox and National Surety was one of privity of 
contract, there could be no identity of interest. Porter cited in support of this position the 
cases of Nunez v. Albo, 53 P. 3d 2 (Ut App 2002) and Penrose v. Ross, 71 P.3d 631 (Ut 
App. 2003). These cases make it clear that there can in fact be an "identity of interest" 
sufficient under the Sulzen and Doxey-Layton cases so as to allow relation back when the 
relationship between the original defendant and the new defendant sought to be brought 
in is one of privity of contract. 
National Surety's Brief Totally Ignores the Nunez v. Albo and Penrose v. Rose 
Decisions. National Surety's Reply Brief fails entirely to deal with either of these two 
cases or this line of reasoning. Porter, on the other hand, used pages 31 through 38 of its 
Appellee's Brief to discuss these critical cases and this issue. National Surety's total 
failure to oppose these arguments should be deemed an admission that they are cogent, 
controlling and warrant granting Porter's appeal on these issues. 
Floyd Cox's Testimony Admitted the Closeness of the Contractor/Surety 
Relationship. The facts adduced from the president of Fox - Floyd Cox - about the 
nature of the financial relationship between Fox and National Surety proved the closeness 
of the relationship. Porter would like to point out again that Floyd Cox testified in these 
regards as follows: 
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"Q.(By Mr. Steffensen) And that was as your counsel indicated, you supplied that 
[(fmancials)] yearly as a condition? 
A. (Cox) Yes. 
Q. Did you have any obligations in connection with your agreements with the bond 
company to notify them if there was any change in condition during the course of a year, 
such as that the financials submitted previously would not be accurate? 
A. I would meet with the bonding agents and representatives of the [Fireman's bond] 
companies at least two or three times a year, and they were veiy well aware of the 
financial situation during the year, what was happening with Fox Construction. 
Mr. Steffensen: And I assume that's because counsel probably would agree that my 
observation of the relationship between a contractor and a bonding company is one 
of almost economic carnal knowledge of one another. Would you agree with that, 
counsel? 
Mr. Price [counsel for Fox]: I've never heard it quite described that way. 
The Witness [Floyd Cox]: I think that describes it well. 
Q. (Mr. Steffensen) Does that describe it well? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean, they expect to "know" you in the Biblical sense as to your financial 
condition? 
A. Let's put it this way: They pretty much knew when I cut my fingernails, yes. 
Q. Okay. And then did you have obligations to keep them informed as to what was 
happening on the jobs, claims and things? 
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A. Absolutely, yes. And it was their obligation to check, and check with the owners. It 
was typical procedure for them. 
Q. And that's what you did on all of the projects you had during your relationship with 
National Surety? 
A. That's correct." (Transcript of Supp. Order Examination of Floyd Cox, Sept. 5, 
2002; 10:1 - 11:17). {Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief From 
Summary Judgment Granted in Favor of National Surety Corporation, R. 965 
Floyd Cox - on behalf of Fox - admitted, with National's attorney present, that the 
relationship between Fox and National was one of "economic carnal knowledge," that 
National "knew" Fox in the Biblical sense as to Fox' financial condition, that National 
knew when Cox/Fox "cut [his] fingernails," that Fox had an obligation to keep National 
informed of "claims and things" on the jobs, and that National had an "obligation to 
check [for claims/problems on the jobs], and check with the owners. It was typical 
procedure for [National]." One cannot imagine a more close "economic relationship" 
than this. It is certainly as close, if not closer, than the employee/employer relationship 
which Nunez found sufficient to allow relation back. 
This is compelling in light of the following language from Penrose: 
"We held that an identity of interest existed between the Hospital and the 
physician [referring to the Nunez decision ] because the cause of action f r arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original 
pleading.'" Id (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 15(c)). This court also noted that the 
Hospital had potential vicarious liability as the employer of the physician. See 
id at fflffflf 27-34. Further, the University provided legal counsel for the physician, 
asserting that the physician was acting within the scope of his employment by the 
Hospital and was entitled to the protections of the Governmental Immunity 
Act.[fii6] See id. 
5 
In Nunez, any disposition of the case against the physician would necessarily 
affect the Hospital's liability. Thus, an identity of interest existed because the 
legal position and defenses of the two parties were the "same." 
The legal positions and defenses of Fox and National in this case are the "same." 
National is a co-obligor with Fox of Fox's obligations to its unpaid subcontractor, Porter. 
If Fox is found liable to Porter, then National is liable to Porter. The interests of a 
principal and surety on all construction jobs - with respect to bond claims, are always 
identical. With respect to payment lawsuits, they always have an identity of interest. 
Given the facts and the new clarifications of the law in Nunez and Penrose, there 
was in fact a sufficient identity of interest between Fox and National under Rule 15( c) to 
allow - nay, require - the claims against National Surety to relate back. Porter will rely 
on its prior briefing on these points, and asks this Court to reverse the dismissal of 
Porter's claims against National Surety on these grounds alone. The relationship between 
Fox and Surely, albeit a privity of contract relationship, was so close that there was an 
identify of interest sufficient to require relation back of the claims against National Surety 
to the date of the original filing of the complaint herein. 
Certainly the Issue of the Closeness of the Relationship Between Fox and 
National - if not Determined Summarily in favor of Porter Given Floyd Cox's 
Admissions - Should Have Been Reserved for Trial. Since Nunez clearly holds that a 
privity of contract relationship may in fact be close enough to allow relation back, 
whether the relationship between Fox and National was in fact close enough to constitute 
an "identity of interest" needs to be explored. As indicated above, Porter believes that 
Floyd Cox's testimony coupled with an application of the principles announced in 
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Penrose require a finding that the economic interest of a contractor and of the contractor's 
surety are "the same" and therefore "identical." 
However, if there is any question, at the very least this is a factual issue which 
should be folly explored in discovery and determined by the trier of fact. 
Equitable Tolling - Discovery Rule Issues - with respect to equitable tolling 
and the discovery rule, Porter articulated the following three issues on appeal. 
Was it reversible error for Judge Bohling to fail to find that the actions of Fox and 
the State of Utah to conceal the identity of the bond company tolled the statute of 
limitations? 
Were their issues of fact as to whether Porter's actions in attempting to learn the 
identity of the bond company were reasonable which should have precluded the granting 
of summary judgment in favor of National? 
Were their factual issues as to whether there were "exceptional circumstances that 
rendered the application of the statute of limitations unjust" which should have precluded 
granting summary judgment in favor of National? 
Porter's Efforts to Discover Whether There Was a Bond or Not Were 
Extensive. A requirement for equitable tolling and/or the discovery rule is that the party 
seeking to invoke the same must have made a reasonable effort to discover the facts. 
Judge Bohling specifically ruled that the efforts of Gary Porter, Mark Porter and counsel 
to try and discover the bond information were not reasonable enough. Fox argues that 
Porter could have at any time asked the University of Utah for the bond information, and 
by statute the University of Utah was required to give it. Well - that is exactly what 
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Porter did. Gary Porter, Mark Porter and attorney Brian Steffensen all communicated 
with the project manager for the University of Utah and asked for the bond information. 
The problem is that in violation of Utah law, the University of Utah did not give any such 
information to Porter. Neither did Fox. Neither did National. 
What was Porter supposed to make of the lack of such information from the 
University of Utah? Porter's witnesses testified that they concluded that there must not 
have been a bond. Porter now asks this Court to find that this was a very reasonable 
conclusion for Porter to reach. Porter asks this Court to reverse Judge Bohling's ruling 
that Porter did not make a reasonable effort to discover whether there was a bond or not. 
Porter Could Not Sue on a Bond Unless Porter Knew That There Was a 
Bond. National argues that Porter knew that it had a cause of action against National as 
soon as it knew that Fox was not paying all monies owed to Porter. Porter did in fact 
suspect that it had a bond claim, and sought diligently to learn if there was in fact a bond 
upon which it could sue. When the University of Utah would not give Porter's counsel 
any bond information, Porter concluded that there must not be bond. Porter did not 
include a bond claim in its original complaint because it was led to believe from the 
silence of the University of Utah that there was no bond. Porter again asks this Court to 
find that this was not an unreasonable belief given the silence of the University of Utah in 
the face of a statutory requirement that it disclose a bond if asked. 
Judge Bohling Should Have Allowed Discovery As to Whether Fox and 
National Conspired to Hide the Bond Information From Porter. Porter believes that 
from the facts available to the trial court there was a reasonable suspicion that Fox, 
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National and/or the University of Utah conspired to conceal the bond information from 
Porter. Fox does not deny that it was asked multiple times about the bond information, 
nor that Fox failed to provide any such information. Fox does not deny that the 
University of Utah was asked for the same information, and that the University contacted 
Fox to discuss whether to give the information to Porter or not. Fox does not deny that 
the University of Utah failed despite Porter's numerous requests, to give any information 
about the bond to Porter. Utah law - as cited by Fox in its Appellant's Reply Brief- was 
violated by one or more of these parties. Porter asked the trial court to delay dismissing 
the claims against National so that these issues could be explored in discovery. The trial 
court refused, and summarily dismissed the claims against National. These issues of fact 
should have been folly explored and no final ruling on dismissal should have been issued 
until the facts were determined by the trier of fact. 
The same should have occurred with respect to the "exceptional circumstances" 
application of the discovery rule. The issues of fact relating to whether there were in fact 
such "exceptional circumstances" which should toll the statute of limitations should have 
been explored folly in discovery and determined by the trier of fact. 
The dismissal of Porter's claims against National was reversible error for any one 
of the foregoing reasons. Said dismissal should be set aside. 
National Entirely Ignored Porter's Claim that Attorney's Fees Should Have 
Been Apportioned Between Work Performed by Defense Counsel on Fox Matters as 
Opposed to Work Performed for National. Porter argued on appeal that even if the 
dismissal of Porter's claims against National Surety is upheld, the trial Court should have 
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required National's defense counsel to apportion their fees between work performed for 
National and work perfonned for Fox. This resulted in National being awarded costs and 
fees for work performed on motions only affecting Fox and the like. The trial court ruled 
that since any ruling for or against Fox would of necessity affect National directly (an 
admission that National's and Fox's legal position were "the same"), Porter should pay all 
of the fees without apportionment. 
However, National has totally ignored Porter's appeal on this point. National has 
made no effort to oppose this part of Porter's appeal. Due to lack of opposition, said 
portion of this appeal should be granted. 
Fox Simply Did Not Properly Dispute Porter's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts. As a Result Porter Was Entitled to Summary 
Judgment Against Fox. 
Fox Attempts to Raise Arguments and Cite Cases for the First Time in 
Support of Its Appeal in its Second/Reply Brief. It appears that Fox's portion of the 
Reply Brief (dealing with Fox's appeal of the Summary Judgment granted against it and 
in favor of Porter) is essentially an attempt to "do over" its Appellant's Brief. It is full 
of new arguments and case law which should have been set forth in its initial Appellant's 
Brief. For instance, the Reply Brief, at pages 35-38, contains an extensive "substantial 
compliance" argument with citations to cases which Fox believes support this argument. 
Nowhere in Fox's initial Appellant's Brief is any such argument made. Similarly, pages 
38 - 43 is a mish mash of both new and some old citations to the record, rather than a true 
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rebuttal of Porter's opposition. 
Rule 24(g) - which deals with cross-appeals - states in part as follows: 
... The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues 
raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the 
issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not 
exceed 25 pages in length. 
In this case, National/Fox - the Appellant for the purposes of these cross appeals - filed 
Fox's initial Appellant's Brief challenging the trial court's granting of summary judgment 
against Fox. Porter then filed it's Appellee's brief, which opposed Fox's appeal, and then 
outlined and argued Porter's appeal of the dismissal of Porter's claims against National 
Surety. Then National/Fox filed their overlength Appellant's Reply Brief to which Porter 
is herein responding. 
Needless to say, a Reply Brief is not the place for new arguments and new 
citations. Porter should not be required to essentially brief anew its opposition to Fox's 
appeal in this, Porter's final Reply Brief. This Reply Brief should have been only for 
Porter's responses to Fox's arguments against Porter's appeal of the order dismissing 
Porter's claims against National Surety. Due to Fox's sloppiness and violation of the 
appellate rules, Porter is now required to squeeze into its twenty-five page allotment a 
second opposition to Fox's entirely new arguments and cases on its appeal issues. This is 
improper. Fox's brief should be stricken for violation of Rule 24(g). 
No Matter How Hard Fox Tries, It Cannot Hide the Serious Deficiencies in its 
Opposition to Porter's Motion for Summary Judgment. The arguments against Fox's 
11 
appeal are really very simple: 
a. Rule 4-501 is to be strictly complied with. 
b. The trial court has discretion to require such strict compliance. 
c. Fox did not comply with Rule 4-501. 
d. Rule 56 is clear - failure to properly dispute statements of undisputed fact results 
in those facts being deemed admitted. 
e. Fox did not in fact dispute Porter's long and detailed Statement of Undisputed 
Facts. 
Compliance with 4-501 is not only Mandatory, but Extremely Important. 
With respect to motions for summary judgment, CJA Rule 4-501(2)(A) requires 
the movant to set forth discrete statements of undisputed fact, in separately numbered 
sentences - and support them each with one or more citations to the record. 
CJA Rule 4-501(2)(B) then requires the opposing party to restate the language of 
each fact which it disputes, and then to set forth a concise statement of material facts 
which support the opposing party's contention that the material fact in question is in 
dispute. The opposing party is also required to support its opposing material fact with a 
citation to the record. 
CJA Rule 4-501 was amended to add the requirement of setting forth verbatim the 
language of the statements of undisputed fact which the opposing party wishes to dispute. 
The purpose of the amendment is obvious - to assist the trial court in evaluating whether 
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or not the facts are actually in dispute. If the parties properly follow CJA Rule 4-501, the 
trial court will find carefully arranged before it (a) each fact which supposedly without 
dispute, and (b) the specific facts upon which the opposing party relies in asserting that 
there is a genuine dispute as to each such fact. 
If one or more of the parties fails to follow CJA Rule 4-501, the trial court's task 
of determining if there are any facts without dispute is made immensely more difficult - if 
not impossible. Hence the ruling in Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339 (Ut App 2003)("Utah 
courts have upheld the necessity of compliance with the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration") cited in Porter's First Brief. Strict compliance with the CJA is is not 
only mandatory, but necessary. 
Judge Bohling Had Discretion to Require Strict Compliance With Rule 4-501, 
Which Discretion Cannot be Assailed on Appeal. The court in Fennell made it clear 
that" ..., the trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with rule 4-501. See 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (upholding 
trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept supplemental memoranda outside 
bounds of rule 4-501)." 77 P.3d 339 Judge Bohling exercised his discretion to require 
strict compliance with CJA 4-501, which discretion can not be set aside absence a 
showing of abuse. Under Fennell, Judge Bohling did not abuse his discretion. 
Consequently, Judge Bohling's order requiring strict compliance with CJA 4-501 should 
not be disturbed in this appeal. 
Fox Did Not "Substantially Comply" with CJA 4-501. Substantial compliance 
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means that you got most of it right. Fox did not get most of it right with respect to 
complying with CJA Rule 4-501. Fox did not set forth verbatim Porter's statements of 
undisputed fact which it wished to dispute. Rather, Fox merely made a list of factual 
statement numbers, and then typed either "admitted" or "denied" next to each number. 
In addition to failing to set forth each of Porter's statements of fact verbatim, Fox did not 
set forth Fox's own statement of material facts which showed why the Porter facts were 
allegedly disputed. When Fox did list a "denied" next to a number, Fox gave no 
explanation whatsoever as to why that numbered fact was denied by Fox. Fox then set 
forth its own statement of facts, which did have some citations to the record. But there 
was no explanation as to how and why Fox believed that these statements "disputed" 
Porter's statements of undisputed fact. Judge Bohling was left, as was the trial court in 
Fennell, with the task of trying to divine how Fox's statement disputed Porter's 
statements. Fox's effort was much less than fifty percent of that required by the rules. 
Fox's effort on its face did not substantially comply with the requirements of CJA Rule 4-
501. 
Both CJA 4-501 and URCP 56 Specifically Provide that if the Movant's 
Statements of Fact are not Disputed, They are Deemed Admitted. Motions for 
summary judgment are seldom granted because if there really are issues of material fact, 
it is relatively easy to point that out and avoid judgment. However, the rules are clear that 
if the opposing party does not demonstrate that the material facts are in dispute, each 
statement of undisputed fact is deemed admitted, and the trial court is required to grant 
such relief as is warranted given the deemed admitted facts. Trial court's do not have 
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discretion to ignore these rules. 
After Taking the Time to Review Fox's "Objection" to Determine if it Did 
Dispute Porter's Material Facts, Judge Bohling Correctly Ruled that the 
"Objection" Did Not Raise any Disputed Issues of Material Fact. Judge Bohling 
could have granted Porter's motion to strike Fox's Objection in its entirety because it was 
grossly late. Judge Bohling could have summarily ruled that due to CJA Rule 4-501 
noncompliance on its face, Fox's Objection was defective. But Judge Bohling went back 
to his chambers for many, many minutes and reviewed Fox's defective "Objection" to see 
if it in fact substantively disputed Porter's statement of undisputed material facts. After 
this exhaustive review, Judge Bohling came to the conclusion that Fox's Objection, even 
given this extensive benefit of the doubt, did not dispute Porter's statement of material 
fact (Judge Bohling also found it to be in violation of 4-501 as an alternate ground for 
granting summary judgment). 
Fox Still Gives This Court No Real Help In Determining Whether or Not Fox 
Disputed Porter's Facts. Even on appeal Fox still has not done what CJA Rule 4-501 
requires. Fox's Objection listed "denied" with respect to Porter's statements nos. 6, 9, 10, 
13, 15, 20, 22, 26, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 50, 53, 55, 57, 62, 63 and 65. Fox 
still has not taken the time or made any real effort to show how or why the sixteen 
statements of fact in Fox's "Objection" supposedly dispute each and every one of these 
numbered paragraphs from Porter's statement. Fox apparently expects this Court of 
Appeals - even after Fox had one hundred pages in two briefs in which to assist the 
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Court in these regards - to do what Judge Bohling went back to his chambers to try to 
do: figure it all out yourselves. 
This is essentially like a failure to marshal the evidence on appeal. Fox's appeal of 
Judge Bohling's order granting summary judgment in favor of Porter should be 
summarily denied because Fox has still not taken the time to show - for each of Porter's 
numbered paragraphs - how Fox's "Objection" legitimately disputed each such statement 
of undisputed fact. 
Fox Has Still Failed to Show With the Requisite Detail How its "Objection" 
Disputed Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts Because it Can not - the Objection 
Does Not In Fact Dispute Porter's Facts. Porter set forth sixty-five (65) separately 
numbered statements of undisputed facts - with a citation to the record for each. Fox 
listed "denied" next to those numbers set forth above without explaining in any detail 
why or how those statements of fact were in fact disputed by admissible evidence. In its 
reply memorandum, R. 614, Porter objected to this failure to comply with 4-501. Porter 
also analyzed each denial substantively and critiqued the same. Finally, Porter addressed 
each of Fox's statements of fact, R. 620-624, and demonstrated that each was either 
inadmissible hearsay, lacked foundation, were irrelevant and/or were simply untrue. 
As indicated in the prior section, this Court should not be required to do Fox's 
work for it. However, Porter did address and dispose of each and every issue raised in 
Fox's Objection in the aforementioned Reply Memorandum, R. 614. 
For example, Porter's statement number 6 states as follows: 
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"6. Porter performed all required work under the written Subcontract. Affidavit of 
Gaiy Porter attached hereto as Exhibit Q" 
Fox merely set forth "denied" next to the number of this paragraph. A quick review of 
the statements of fact in Fox's "Objection" demonstrates that nothing therein purports to 
deny this statement of fact. Fox denied it, but gave no facts (with citations to the record) 
to support that denial. This typical of Fox's "Objection" and now this appeal. Fox says 
that it disputed Porter's facts, but the truth as determined by a detailed examination of 
Fox's "Objection" is vastly different. 
Fox's Main Argument Was and Is a Claim that Section 02300 of the Plans & 
Specifications Was "Left Out" of the Written Subcontract - but This Argument 
Fails Due to a Failure to Show Fraud or Mutual Mistake. Fox's "Objection" clumsily 
attempted to create an issue of fact by claiming that Section 02300 of the Plans and 
Specifications for the project had been "left out" by Fox from the parties written 
subcontract. Fox has to make this argument because the written subcontract (found as 
Exhibit A to Porter's Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
R.418) clearly does not list Sections 02300, 02665 and 02711 - and Porter did all the 
work under these sections. 
However, as pointed out in Porter's Reply Memorandum in support of Porter's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 614, 626, as a matter of law this desperate argument 
must fail because (a) the written subcontract was drafted by Fox (via its project manager 
Jeff Wood); (b) the written subcontract clearly leaves out section 02300 (and the other 
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sections listed above, which Fox ignores and therefore admits); (c) the written 
subcontract contains an integration clause, (d) there is no claim of fraud and (e) there is 
no evidence of mutual mistake. 
The general rule is "that in the absence of fraud, an apparently complete and 
certain agreement which the parties have reduced to writing will be conclusively 
presumed to contain the whole agreement; and that parol evidence of contemporaneous 
[or prior] conversations, representations or statements will not be received for the purpose 
of varying or adding to the terms of the written agreement." Spears v. Warr. 2002 WL 
377522 (Utah), pg. 6; citing, Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 
1981). Thus, Fox's attempt to use statements from Mr. Cox and Mr. Wood that 
specification section 02300 was left out of the subcontract by mistake is inadmissable. 
There Are No Facts Which Support Fox's Theory of Mutual Mistake. To 
support its claim of mutual mistake, Fox must prove that both parties, at the time of 
contracting, shared a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which 
they based their bargain. Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). The evidence cited by Fox is insufficient to demonstrate that both 
parties shared a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they 
based their bargain. 
Fox's estimator/project manager, Jeff Wood, testified that he was responsible for 
drafting the parties' written subcontract. Jeff Wood also testified that he does not recall 
having any discussions with Mr. Cox about Plaintiffs Subcontract Agreement. 
Furthermore, Jeff Wood testified that the bid/estimate provided by Porter was only used 
to do change orders and track Plaintiffs billing and was not used to generate the parties' 
subcontract. This testimony coupled with Mr. Cox's testimony that he was not a party to 
any conversations between Gary Porter and Jeff Wood concerning specification section 
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023005 that he does not know what they talked about, nor whether or not he had a 
conversation with Jeff Wood following Mr. Wood's conversation with Gary Porter 
demonstrates that Mr. Cox is not competent to testify as to the intent of the parties at the 
time of drafting the contract. Therefore, any testimony provided by Mr. Cox to dispute 
Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts is not admissible. 
Moreover, Fox cannot identify any evidence demonstrating that Porter shared the 
same misconception about the scope of work to be performed by Porter under the terms 
of the parties' written subcontract. Fox asserts that Porter acknowledged the mistake in 
the parties' written subcontract by pleading that another completely separate specification 
section (02680) was included in the subcontract. Such is not the case. Merely because 
the parties mutually agreed that one section was not to be performed by Porter, does not 
imply that another section should have been included. Just the opposite. The fact that 
there was an immediate agreement between the parties that the inclusion of section 02680 
was in error demonstrates that the parties were aware of the scope of work in the contract 
and knowledgeably dealing with it. They agreed that section 02680 should have been left 
out. There is no evidence of any such mutual agreement with respect to section 02300 
and the other sections. Why? Because there was no mistake as to the exclusion of these 
other sections. 
Judge Bohling's ruling in granting Porter summary judgment was based in part on 
this analysis and is fully correct. 
Even If This Court Concludes That A Genuine Issue of Material Facts Existed 
on the Issue of Mutual Mistake Concerning Specification Section 02300, There Was 
No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Precluding Porter From Summary Judgment 
For the Remainder of the Additional Work Performed by Porter. Although Fox has 
claimed that a material issue of disputed facts existed which should have precluded 
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Porter from summary judgment as a matter of law for work performed in connection with 
specification section 02300 of the project manual, Fox has utterly failed to dispute that 
Porter performed all of the work required of it under the parties' written subcontract and 
all the remaining additional work performed at the request of Fox. If this Court is 
inclined to get into the details when Fox has done nothing to assist this Court with those 
details, Porter respectfully notes that the total amount of work claimed by Porter under 
the terms of the parties' written subcontract as modified was $296,750.70 of which only 
$63,993.70 is attributable to the work performed pursuant to specification section 02300. 
These figures have not been disputed in any way by Fox This leaves a total contract 
amount of $232,757.00. Fox does not dispute that Fox has paid Plaintiff a total of 
$135,441.62, This leaves an undisputed amount due of $97,315.38 for work performed 
and not paid under the terms of the parties' written subcontract as modified. Therefore, if 
the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material facts exists as to whether 
specification section 02300 was in fact to be included in the parties' written subcontract, 
Plaintiff is still entitled to partial summary judgment in the amount of $97,315.38. 
There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact Concerning the Additional 
Work Performed Outside the Scope of the Parties' Written Subcontract. The 
general rule is that parties to a contract may by mutual consent, modify any or all of a 
contract. TedR. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp. 753 P. 2d 964, 968 (UtahApp. 1988). 
The undisputed material facts demonstrate that Porter was requested to perform additional 
work outside the scope of the parties' original written subcontract. As demonstrated 
above, even if the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material facts was created 
concerning specification section 02300, there still would remain $97,315.38 in additional 
work performed by Porter outside the scope of the parties' written subcontract but at the 
request of Fox. Fox's conclusory statements that a genuine issue of material facts exists 
concerning Porter's approach to any claimed change order is unsupported. Jeff Wood's 
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own testimony demonstrates that Fox owed Plaintiff at least $188,633.30 for the work 
performed under the scope of the parties' written Subcontract and the additional work 
performed pursuant to the utilities redesign and specification sections 02300, 02665 and 
02711. Furthermore, Fox's own conduct of requesting and partially paying Plaintiff for 
work outside the scope of the parties' written subcontract over the course of Plaintiff s 
involvement on the Project demonstrates that Fox agreed to pay Plaintiff for that 
additional work performed. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT BY PORTER 
Porter asks this Court to: 
(a) affirm the summary judgment against Fox, 
(b) authorize an award of additional attorney's fees and costs in connection with this 
appeal, 
(c) reverse the summary judgment in favor of National and against Porter, 
(d) reverse the award of attorney's fees to National, 
(e) in the alternative, require National's attorneys to allocate their fees between work for 
Fox and work for National, and 
(f) if the summary judgment in favor of National is reversed and the summary judgment 
against Fox is affirmed, to direct that judgment be entered in favor of Porter and against 
National for the same amounts previously awarded to Porter, plus costs and fees. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2004. 
Steffensen • Law •Office 
Attorney fbj Plaintiff/ / \j 
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